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A Conduct-Oriented Approach to the
Glass-Steagall Act
The Glass-Steagall Act' requires that commercial banking be separated
from investment banking.2 Courts and regulatory agencies interpreting the
prescribed separation often rely on technical and semantic considerations
in deciding whether an investment constitutes a "security" for the pur-
poses of the Act.' This Note argues that such a "definitional" approach
obscures the Act's purposes.4 The Note maintains that the applicable pro-
visions of the Act are intended to bar commercial banks from engaging in
a particular, identifiable pattern of conduct and that adoption of a "con-
duct" test for enforcement of the separation provision would serve the
Act's legislative objectives better than the current approach. The Note
concludes by applying these alternative approaches to a current Glass-
Steagall controversy-the legality of commercial banks' underwriting of
commercial paper.'
1. The Glass-Steagall Act is the popular name for the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162
(codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). For a general discussion of the Act, see Perkins, The
Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking. A History, 88 BANKING L.J. 483 (1971).
2. See Banking Act of 1933, §§ 16, 21, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 378 (1976). The Banking Act of 1933
contained many provisions of great importance to the banking system, such as those creating the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The term "Glass-Steagall Act," however, has generally come
to refer exclusively to the sections of the Banking Act that pertain to commercial banks' securities
activities. Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act approaches the Banking Act's legislative goals from the
perspective of the commercial banker and § 21 approaches the legislative goals from the perspective of
the investment banker. Section 16 prohibits commercial banks from engaging in "underwriting" or
investment banking while § 21 bars organizations "engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting,
selling or distributing" securities from receiving deposits. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v.
Investment Co. Inst., 101 S. Ct. 973, 976 (1981). This Note addresses the § 16 congressional concerns
of commercial bank activity in the investment banking field.
3. See Karmel, Glass-Steagall: Some Critical Reflections, 97 BANKING L.J. 631, 633, 634 (1980)
(Glass-Steagall characterizes banking activity as permissible or impermissible on basis of whether a
security is involved in the transaction); Plotkin, What Meaning Does Glass-Steagall Have for Today's
Financial World? 95 BANKING L.J. 404, 411 (1978).
4. See Keeffe, Your Friendly One Stop Financial Shopping Center, 60 A.B.A. J. 744, 745 (1974).
5. Commercial bank activity in the commercial paper market began on July 26, 1978, when
Bankers Trust Company, a state bank member of the Federal Reserve System, started selling com-
mercial paper of corporations to investors. See H. Pitt & J. Kempner, The Commercial Paper Activi-
ties of Bankers Trust Company 1-2 (January 31, 1979) (unpublished, memorandum on behalf of A.
G. Becker Inc. to the Staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on file with Yale
Law Journal).
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I. The Purposes of the Glass-Steagall Act
Congress enacted the Glass-Steagall Act for two purposes. First, and
most importantly, it sought to eliminate the conflicts of interest that arise
when commercial banks engage in the sale of securities." Second, it sought
to prevent loss of public confidence in the banking system, which had led
to runs on banks and to bank failures at the start of the Great
Depression.7
Congress found these problems so compelling that it chose to prohibit
banks from engaging in both commercial and promotional activities alto-
gether, rather than just to regulate their activities when they engaged in
both businesses. Besides the original Congressional purposes behind
Glass-Steagall, however, today the Act serves the additional, important
purpose of decentralizing investment activity.'
Glass-Steagall safeguards restrict competition between investment and
commercial banks, but even the most procompetitive commentators ac-
knowledge that the fiduciary responsibilities of commercial banking opera-
tions present unavoidable conflicts of interest with the promotional opera-
tions of corporate investment banking.9 Thus, any competitive benefits
that would arise from commercial bank entry into investment banking are
outweighed by the "hazards" and "financial dangers" posed by allowing
commercial banks to underwrite securities.10
6. See Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 101 U.S. 987 (1981);
Investment Co, Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 633 (1971); 75 CONG. REC. 9912 (1932) (remarks of
Sen. Bulkley).
7. See Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 101 S. Ct. 973, 984
(1981); S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 8, 10 (1935); 77 CONG. REC. 3825 (remarks of Rep.
Glass); Plotkin, supra note 3, at 407; Note, The Legality of Bank Sponsored Investment Services, 84
YALE L.J. 1477, 1487 (1975).
8. The Glass-Steagall Act continues to have a great deal of vitality today, over fifty years after its
enactment. See Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 101 S. Ct. 973, 991
n.55 (1981). The legislative history of The Bank Holding Amendments Act of 1970, Title I, 84 Stat.
1763, indicates that Congress intended the Amendments to reinforce Glass-Steagall. 116 CONG. REC.
42,430 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
9. See UNITED STATES PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND REGULATION 52 (1971) [hereinafter cited as U.S. PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION REPORT]. The Commission's prime objective was to increase competition among financial
institutions. See id. at 121.
Competition may actually be enhanced, however, by separating investment banking from commer-
cial banking. Although commercial banks and investment banks may not offer the same services, they
do offer substitutable services. The enforced separation of commercial and investment banking places
pressure on each market to innovate in order to compete with the other. The growth of the commer-
cial paper market is an example of the beneficial aspects of bifurcated markets. Commercial paper is
an investment banking product that competes with the corporate lending services of commercial paper.
See p. 115 infra; Stephen J. Friedman, Investment Management and the Glass-Steagall Act - The
Emperors' New Clothes 5 (November 13, 1980) (unpublished remarks to Association of Bank Hold-
ing Companies) (on file with Yale Law Journal); c Bennett, Corporate Loans Soar at Banks, N.Y.
Times, December 16, 1980, § D (Business), at 12, col. 1 (commercial banks are "aggressively cutting
prices to compete for business with the commercial paper market").
10. This was the view when Glass-Steagall was passed. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401
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A. Conflicts of Interest
The Act's prohibition of commercial bank underwriting" was also
meant to encourage commercial banks to render strictly impartial advice
to depositors, correspondent bankers, and other customers. Congress rec-
ognized the inherent conflict between the commercial banking role of im-
partial advisor and the investment banking role of promotional under-
writer.12 Commercial bankers routinely advise corporate clients about
whether their corporations should issue debt and about the best structure
and timing of debt issues." Congress did not want the impartiality of this
advice to be tainted by a desire to profit from the promotion of one partic-
ular security over another.'4 Congress wanted this investment advice to be
based solely on sound business judgment and to be free of promotional
incentives such as sales or distribution commissions."5
Investment banks, however, sell securities 6 and promote the debt obli-
gations of third parties in order to earn sales or distribution commissions.
Commercial banks therefore face conflicts of interest when they engage in
investment banking because of the different institutional roles played by
commercial and investment banks.
One set of conflicts arises when the commercial bank attempts to con-
vince corporate customers to make public offerings of securities through
the bank. Investment banks require a continuous supply of securities in
order to maintain distribution channels, which are difficult and expensive
to develop. 7 These distribution channels comprise the most important
part of the investment banker's service. The drafters of Glass-Steagall re-
alized that a commercial banker cannot render impartial advice about the
U.S. 617, 630 (1971). It remains the prevailing view today. See U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION RE.
PORT, supra note 9, at 52; note 28 infra.
11. See note 40 infra.
12. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 634 (1971).
13. Members of the Glass-Steagall Congress recognized that corporate treasurers rely heavily on
the advice of commercial bankers to solve intricate business problems. See 75 CONG. REC. 9912 (1932)
(remarks of Sen. Bulkley). Congress sought to construct a financial system in which the commercial
banker could be regarded as "confidant and mentor" of his depositors. This relationship was viewed
as natural and desirable for both the small depositor and the "great corporation." Id.
14. 75 CONG. Rec. 9912 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bulkley).
15. A Resolution to Make a Complete Survey of the National and Federal Reserve Banking
Systems: Hearings on S. Res. 71 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Cur-
rency, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 1052 n.24 (1931) (remarks of Rep. Glass) (congressional goal of prevent-
ing commercial banks from "merchandising" securities); 75 CONG. REC. 9912 (1932) (remarks of Sen.
Bulkley).
16. Investment banking by definition consists of underwriting and selling stocks and bonds. An
investment banker is an underwriter who serves as a "middleman" between the corporation issuing
securities and the investors who purchase them.
17. Congress recognized at the time Glass-Steagall was passed that it was unreasonable to expect
a banker to give impartial investment advice after developing expensive securities distribution systems.
Practical business considerations lead inexorably to the biased promotion of those securities in inven-
tory. 75 CONG. REC. 9911 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bulkley).
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"necessity and soundness" of a new securities issue if he or she has an
incentive to feed the costly distribution channels 8 that the bank has so
expensively developed, and that can absorb the new security issue and
make a distribution profit for the bank whether or not the issue is needed
by the issuer. 9 Prohibiting commercial banks from engaging in investment
banking activities alleviates the temptation to exert undue pressure on the
corporate customer to issue a security.2"
A second set of conflicts results from the temptation banks have to pro-
mote a securities issue so that the issuing corporation can use the proceeds
to repay bank loans or to pay down bank lines of credit.' This problem is
particularly serious during periods of high interest rates, when the cost of
issuing certain securities is low relative to commercial banking rates.
A third conflict of interest problem is that the commercial bank's stake
in an investment banking venture may lead it to make unsound loans or
credit advances22 to companies whose securities it is promoting. The bor-
rowing costs of issuing a debt security are closely linked to the credit rat-
ing assigned to that security; the better the rating, the lower the interest
rate.23 A bank that grants a large back-up line of credit to a corporation
improves the company's credit rating and aids the underwriter in the sales
of the company's debt.24 If commercial banks could conduct an underwrit-
ing business, they might be tempted to make unsound loans to the firms
whose securities they were promoting.
Separating investment from commercial banking, on the other hand,
18. Congress acted to keep commercial banks out of investment banking because the "promotional
incentives" and "pecuniary stakes" in the success of particular investment opportunities were destruc-
tive of prudent commercial banking. S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1925); 75 CONG. REC.
9911 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bulkley).
19. 75 CONG. REC. 9911 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bulkley). Senator Bulkley's remarks have been
treated as authoritative by courts, in part because he was addressing Congress on the subject of the
separation of commercial and investment banking at the specific request of the chairman of the Senate
Banking Committee, Senator Glass. 75 CONG. REC. 9909 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bulkley).
20. 75 CONG. REC. 9912 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bulkley). One reason that some members of
Congress did not want commercial banks to exert this promotional pressure was to protect the corpo-
ration from issuing too much debt. Id. at 9911.
21. Id.; Telephone interviews with Patrick Doyle, Counsel to the Multinational Banking Divi-
sion, Law Department, Comptroller of the Currency (October 17, 1980 & December 12, 1980). A
bank line of credit is a fixed amount of credit extended by a bank to its customer to cover a series of
transactions. The customer may avail himself of this amount at any time. When the customer's line of
credit is nearly exhausted, he is expected to reduce his indebtedness by payments to the bank before
drawing upon it further.
22. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 637 (1971) (bank's stake in issuing corporation
might distort credit decisions).
23. See Hurley, The Commercial Paper Market, 63 FED. RES. BULL. 526, 529 (1977); Letter
from Bankers Trust Company to an anonymous commercial paper issuer (November 21, 1978) (on
file with Yale Law Journal) (most important consideration in entering commercial paper market is
having top ratings).
24. See Harries, How Corporate Bonds and Commercial Paper Are Rated, FINANCIAL EXECU-
TIVE, September 1971, at 30.
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provides an "independent and impartial check" on the soundness of the
promotional security.2" This impartial check occurs regularly because a
commercial bank typically makes a credit check of a corporation that is
planning to issue securities for the purpose of determining whether to ex-
tend a back-up line of credit.26 This line of credit has become a "tradi-
tional safeguard of the market ' 27 because it provides additional insurance
to the purchaser of the corporate debt that the obligation will be repaid.
B. Bank Stability
Congress was convinced that banks' speculative securities promotion 
2
and perilous underwriting activities29 led to the loss of depositor confi-
dence and customer good will that caused the depression era bank runs.3 0
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which was created by the
Banking Act of 1933, effectively halted runs on banks and thereby miti-
gated most depositors' risk of loss from bank failures. 1 Thus, the conflicts
of interest arising from commercial bank investment banking activity pro-
vide the most compelling basis for Glass-Steagall's continued support in
Congress32 and the courts.3 The Glass-Steagall Act's prohibition of com-
mercial bank underwriting was designed to promote bank stability by sup-
plementing the role played by deposit insurance in achieving public confi-
dence in the commercial banking system. The Glass-Steagall Act was also
25. 75 CONG. REC. 9912 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bulkley).
26. See Note, Commercial Paper and the Securities Acts, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 372 (1972).
27. J. LIGHT & W. WHITE, THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 281 (1979); see Loomis, The Lesson of The
Credit Crisis, FORTUNE, May 1971, at 141, 143 (commercial bank lines of credit prevented collapse of
commercial paper market in 1970).
28. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 101 S. Ct. 973, 984 (1981),
slip op. at 14, (February 24, 1981). See S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 10 (1935); 77 CONG.
REC. 3907 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Koppleman); 77 CONG. REC. 3835 (1933) (remarks of Rep.
Glass).
29. See S. REP. NO. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1933); 77 CONG. REC. 3835 (1933) (remarks of
Rep. Glass).
30. See Hearings on the Operation of the National and Federal Reserve Banking System: S. Res.
71 Before the Banking Subcomm. of the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 116,
117, 1017, 1068 (1931) [hereinafter cited as 1931 Hearings]; 75 CONG. REC. 9912 (1932) (remarks of
Sen. Bulkley) (commercial bank may be put in financial danger); Lybecker, Bank Sponsored Invest-
ment Management Services: A Legal History and Statutory Interpretive Analysis - Part 1, 5 SEC.
REG. L.J. 110, 129 (1977) (extensive failure of banks in wake of stock market crash of 1929).
31. See U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 44. Federal deposit insurance
coverage is limited to $40,000 per account per bank. Among the losses not covered are losses on
securities purchased from member banks.
Federal deposit insurance does not actually prevent bank failures. When failures occur, there is a
delay that prevents the depositor from gaining immediate access to his money. [1979] FED. DEPOSIT
INS. CORP. ANN. REP. 14-15, 49-60, 131.
32. Congress intended the recent Bank Holding Company Act to strengthen and maintain Glass-
Steagall's restrictions on the relationship between commercial and investment banking. Board of Gov-
ernors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 101 S. Ct. 973, 988 (1981).
33. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve
Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 101 S. Ct. 973 (1981).
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intended to promote bank stability by preventing commercial banks from
being discredited by adverse reactions to promotional, investment banking
activity."'
C. Prohibition vs. Regulation
Congress heard much debate over whether the problems posed by com-
mercial banks' securities activities should be solved by regulation or prohi-
bition. 5 It chose outright prohibition because its policy objectives could
not be achieved through regulation. 6 It considered regulation to be inef-
fective because the problems and conflicts inherent in commercial bank
participation in the promotion of securities are "so subtle as not to be
easily recognized,"37 and because securities underwriting is fundamentally
incompatible with commercial banking. The universally recognized
means for achieving Congress's objectives was to separate commercial
banking from investment banking. 9 The separation was accomplished
through section 16,40 which limits national banks' purchases and sales of
securities to agency executions made solely on a customer's order, and
through section 21,4" which makes it unlawful for investment banks to
34. The recent New York City financial crisis exemplifies how promotional investment activity
can discredit banks and thus weaken their stability. Commercial banks are permitted by § 16 of the
Glass-Steagall Act to underwrite municipal bonds. See p. 109 infra. New York City's commercial
banks became deeply involved in the events leading to the city's financial crisis, and were at the center
of the controversy because of their allegedly disreputable conduct and motives in dumping deflated
New York City bonds on unsuspecting bank customers. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
35. See Hearings on S. Res. 71 Before the Subcomm. on Banking of the Senate Comm. on Bank-
ing and Currency, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., Pt. 1, at 19-22 (testimony of J. W. Pole, Comptroller of the
Currency); id. at 191-92 (testimony of Albert H. Wiggin, Chairman of the Board, Chase National
Bank); id. at 238-41 (testimony of B. W. Trafford, Vice-Chairman, First National Bank of Boston);
id. Pt. 2, at 301-04, 318 (testimony of Charles E. Mitchell, Chairman of the Board of National City
Bank of New York); id. Pt. 2, at 356, 364-65 (testimony of Owen D. Young, Chairman of the Board,
General Electric Co.); id. Pt. 3, at 539 (testimony of Allan M. Pope, Executive Vice-President of
First National-Old Colony Corp.).
36. Even those witnesses who opposed the complete separation of commercial and investment
banking favored regulation of commercial banks' securities activities. See Perkins, supra note 1, at
506.
37. 75 CONG. REC. 9912 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bulkley). The Supreme Court has pointed out
that Congress "repeatedly focused on the more subtle hazards" that arise when a commerical bank
goes beyond the business of acting as fiduciary agent and enters the field of investment banking.
Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630 (1971).
38. See 75 CONG. REC. 9912 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bulkley) (mere existence of commercial
bank securities operation "no matter how carefully and conservatively run is inconsistent with the best
interests of the bank as a whole"); Perkins, supra note 1, at 506, 507 (same).
39. See Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 101 S. Ct. 973, 984-85
(1981).
40. Section 16 of the Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 524 (seventh) (1976), provides that:
The business of dealing in securities and stock by . . .the [national bank] shall be limited to
purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and
for the account of customer, and in no case for its own account, and the [national bank] shall
not underwrite any issue of securities or stock.
41. Section 21 of the Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (1976), provides that:
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accept deposits.42
D. The Decentralization Function of the Glass-Steagall Act
Analysis of the current function of the fifty-year-old Glass-Steagall Act
raises issues that were not considered by the original drafters.43 Principal
among these concerns is whether the Glass-Steagall Act prevents an un-
due concentration of capital44 or of authority over capital allocation deci-
sions.4" Today, Glass-Steagall serves the important political and economic
function of decentralizing both capital formation and investment
decisionmaking.
46
Decentralization requires limits on the activities of commercial banks,47
which, because they dispense credit, have an inherent competitive advan-
tage over other entities that perform the same services." Customers often
prefer to give business to a bank that can loan money, even if the bank's
price is higher than49 or its performance inferior to0 that of non-bank
competitors. Customers think that they will have easier access to credit if
[It shall be unlawful] for any person, or. . . organization, engaged in the business of issuing,
underwriting, selling, or distributing . . . stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities,
to engage at the same time . . . in the business of receiving deposits.
42. An example of a § 21 controversy involves money market mutual funds that are offered by
investment banks. Customers of these funds earn high interest rates on accounts against which they
may write checks. Commercial banks contend that these money market funds violate § 21 of Glass-
Steagall. See N.Y. Times, March 3, 1981, § D (Business), at 1, col. 3; BUS. WEEK, March 2, 1981, at
49.
43. See Karmel, supra note 3, at 632.
44. See R. Schotland, What Issues Are Alive in Glass-Steagall Today? 3 (March 24, 1977) (un-
published address at Golembe Associates seminar on Competition in Banking, Chicago, Illinois) (on
file with Yale Law Journal) (danger that American financial community could become as heavily
concentrated as its Japanese counterpart).
45. See Hearings on Bank Holding Company Amendments Before the House Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1969).
46. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, March 24, 1969, at 461. Banking
trends, if left unchecked, may lead to formation of a small number of power centers that dominate the
economy, a result that federal banking policy has long opposed. Id. One reason for this opposition is
that excessive concentration weakens the capitalist system by eliminating the smaller businesses that
are its political first line of defense. See J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY
140 (2d ed. 1962); Taylor, Commercial vs. Investment Banks, The Case Against, 55 HARV. BUS.
REV. 138, 144 (1977). But see Angermueller, Commercial vs. Investment Banks, The Case For, 55
HARV. BUS. REv. 132, 132; Schotland, supra note 44, at 3. The ideal of decentralization stems from a
desire to avoid what Arthur Burns, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, describes as the
"Zaibatsu problem," a situation in which economic power is concentrated in a few giant power cen-
ters as in Japan. Hearings on Bank Holding Company Amendments Before the House Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1969) (testimony of Arthur Burns).
47. See Schotland, supra note 44, at 3. From an historical perspective, Glass-Steagall is part of a
long-standing American policy that the capital markets must remain diverse.
48. See 125 CONG. REC. 236 (1979) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
49. Id.
50. See PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS, January 1, 1979, at 6 (corporate clients have retained com-
mercial ties with poorly performing banks because of fear that corporate relations will be jeopardized
if they dismiss banks).
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they buy the other services of the bank,"' and this perception leads to "co-
erced or voluntary" tie-in sales.12 This advantage has consistently led to
commercial bank dominance in those areas of the capital market that they
have been able to penetrate."
II. The Current Interpretation of Glass-Steagall
The decentralization function and the congressional objectives behind
Glass-Steagall are currently being thwarted because the fixed, historical
definitions presently employed cannot keep pace with the rapidly evolving
capital markets. Since the passage of Glass-Steagall, new securities have
been created 4 and old securities have changed dramatically in character;"
even the securities markets themselves have changed. 6
A. The Language of the Statute
Section sixteen 7 is the foundation 8 of the Glass-Steagall Act, and the
focal point of the current interpretation of the Act. 9 Section 16 divides the
permissible areas of commercial bank securities into three categories and
provides rules of conduct for each category. First, it allows commercial
banks to buy, sell, or underwrite United States government debt and gen-
eral obligations of states and municipalities. 0 This provision is unambigu-
ous and has required little clarification: 61 it permits banks to deal in debt
obligations that are subject to the general taxing power of a government
entity.6" Second, section sixteen creates a sub-category of securities known
as "investment securities."' 63 Commercial banks may buy these securities
for their own account, but may not underwrite, distribute, sell, or deal in
51. 125 CONG. REC. 236 (1979) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
52. Id.
53. See Perkins, supra note 1, at 495-96.
54. Karmel, supra note 3, at 636; see Note, supra note 7, at 1490 (term "security" now applied to
everything from interests in condominiums to warehouse receipts).
55. See Note, supra note 26, at 374.
56. See Friedman, supra note 9, at 2. Significant changes include the use of short term obligations
to finance long term capital needs, modern cash management systems, securities issued for arbitrage
purposes, and the continuous "roll-over" of debt obligations.
57. See note 40 supra.
58. Karmel, supra note 3, at 633.
59. The current interpretation of Glass-Steagall focuses on defining the term "security." See note
71 infra; Karmel, supra note 3, at 633-34.
60. The limitations and restrictions herein contained as to dealing in, underwriting and
purchasing for its own account, investment securities shall not apply to obligations of the
United States, or general obligations of any State or of any political subdivision thereof.
12 U.S.C. § 24 (seventh) (1976).
61. The clarity of the provision has resulted in a paucity of litigation on the subject. See Baker,
Watts & Co. v. Saxon, 261 F. Supp. 247, 252 (D.D.C. 1966), alTd, 392 F.2d 497 (1968).
62. The government debt exception rests on long-standing public policy favoring governmental
debt obligations. Baker, Watts & Co. v. Saxon, 261 F. Supp. 247, 252 (D.D.C. 1966).
63. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (seventh) (1970).
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 91: 102, 1981
them. The Comptroller of the Currency has statutory authority to decide
which debt instruments fall in this category,"4 and few problems arise in
this area.' s Third, section sixteen permits banks to buy or sell any security
without recourse, solely on the order of and for the account of customers."6
This agency exception was enacted to enable banks to service communities
far from financial centers.
Similarly, banks may engage in private placements of securities without
violating Glass-Steagall." Private placements, which may be offered only
to a small number of sophisticated investors, 9 do not constitute "under-
writing" within the. terms of Glass-Steagall because they do not involve a
"distribution" of securities.70
B. The Present Interpretation of the Statute
The current approach to resolving Glass-Steagall controversies involves
two steps. It first requires a definition of the word "security."' , Because
64. Id.
65. Congress allows banks to purchase investment securities for their own account to provide a
means to satisfy the reserve asset requirement of the Federal Reserve Board.
66. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (seventh) (1976).
67. See Hearings on H.R. 5357 Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 663 (1935). The agency exception was introduced into Glass-Steagall in 1935 by an amend-
ment proposed by the Comptroller. H.R. REP. No. 742, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1935); S. REP. No.
10007, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1935).
68. Federal Reserve Board Staff, Commercial Bank Private Placement Activities (June 1977)
(unpublished staff report on file with Yale Law Journal). A private placement, also known as a direct
placement, is an alternative to an open-market sale of securities. A private placement consists of direct
negotiation of a debt obligation between a corporate borrower and an institutional investor. C. HEN-
NING, W. PIGOT, R. SCOTT, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE ECONOMY 296 (2d ed. 1978).
The exception for private placements is consistent with the general policies of the Glass-Steagall
Act and therefore with the conduct approach suggested in this Note. A private placement conducted
by a bank must conform with the restrictions of § 16. The commercial bank can act only as an agent,
in a non-recourse transaction initiated on a customer's order. See Federal Reserve Board Staff, supra
(June 1977) (unpublished staff report on file with Yale Law Journal). The issue of whether banks
are engaged in "private placements" of securities can best be resolved by examining the conduct of the
commercial bank.
69. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953). Private placements are only available to
persons who have the same information regarding the issuer that registration would provide, and who
are able to fend for themselves. Id. Private placements were intended to permit an issuer to make an
isolated, specific sale of securities to a single person. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 410 (4th ed. 1977).
70. Cf I LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 653-54 n.43 (2d ed. 1961) (there is no underwriting in
private placement because there is no distribution); Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, & Federal Reserve Board, Commercial Bank Private Placement Activities 4
(June 1, 1978) (unpublished staff report on file with Yale Law Journal).
71. Karmel, supra note 3, at 632.
One version of the definitional approach is to apply to Glass-Steagall controversies the definition of
"security" used in the Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77aa (Supp. 11 1978)). See Letter from Ralph C. Ferrara, General Counsel, Securities and Exchange
Commission, to Neal L. Petersen, General Counsel, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem 3 (April 20, 1979) (on file with Yale Law Journal). The rationale for employing the Securities
Act definition for Glass-Steagall purposes is that the two laws were enacted within a few weeks of
each other and the Senate Committee on Banking and Finance was responsible for both pieces of
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Glass-Steagall applies only to "securities," the Act is not violated if no
security is involved.7" If the debt instrument in question is found to be a
security, an inquiry is then made into whether the bank is underwriting,
trading, or dealing in the security.
The current method of resolving Glass-Steagall disputes may lead to
underinclusive results. This underinclusiveness is exemplified by the com-
mercial-paper controvery, in which the Federal Reserve Board gave an
arbitrary, narrow reading to the word "security" and thus permitted ac-
tivity that the Act was intended to preclude.7" The current interpretation
could result in an overly broad reading of the term security, which could
lead to the proscription of legitimate commercial banking activity.
74
In addition, the present method of interpreting Glass-Steagall results in
the drawing of legal distinctions between interchangeable terms such as
"loan" and "security, ' 75 distinctions that do not arise from the policy
objectives of the Act. These legal distinctions are formalistic fictions. As
investors and financial markets have evolved and become more sophisti-
cated, market participants increasingly have come to view both securities
and loans merely as financing vehicles, and traditional definitional distinc-
tions between them as mattters of form rather than of substance.
76
Under the current interpretation of the Act, the securities markets
legislation. But this definitional approach is unacceptable because it does not recognize that the Glass-
Steagall Act and the Securities Act of 1933 were enacted for different purposes. The former act was
intended to stop the commercial banking abuses and conflicts that led to the bank failures of the
Depression. See pp. 103-107 supra. The latter act was designed to regulate the distribution and un-
derwriting activities of investment banks. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 420 F.2d 83, 89
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Lydecker, Bank Sponsored Investment Management Services: A Legal History and
Statutory Interpretive Analysis (pt. 2), 5 SEC. REG. L.J. 195, 207-08 (1978). Permissible banking
activity under Glass-Steagall is determined by "semantical characterization" of whether debt instru-
ments constitute securities.
72. See Karmel, supra note 3, at 632; Federal Reserve System, Statement Regarding Petitions to
Initiate Enforcement Action 24 (September 26, 1980) (unpublished) [hereinafter cited as Federal Re-
serve Statement].
73. See pp. 115-17 infra.
74. Examples of legitimate commercial banking devices that could fall prey to erroneous interpre-
tations of Glass-Steagall are loan participations, bankers acceptances, and certificates of deposit. See
pp. 119-20 infra.
75. The terms are interchangeable because loans and securities serve the same purpose. Both are
mechanisms for raising money at a certain price, or interest rate. With either instrument, the creditor
gives value in the hope of gain in the form of interest paid by the borrower. See Exchange Nat'l Bank
v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1136-37 (2d Cir. 1976); C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G.
Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1359 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Fitzgibbon,
What is a Security? - A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to Participate in the Financial Markets,
64 MINN. L. REV. 893 (1980); cf. I L. LOSS, supra note 70, at 455 n.1 ("Even such terms as 'stock'
and 'bond' do not have altogether fixed meanings . . . . [Some] instruments . . . 'defy classifica-
tion.' "); Friedman, supra note 9, at 2 (evolution of securities markets has "outpaced" current banking
regulations).
76. See Fitzgibbon, supra note 75, at 937. The statutory definitions of the term "security" that are
currently used to implement the securities laws of the 1930's are largely denominative. As a result,
there is considerable confusion about the meaning of the term.
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shape the laws; the laws do not shape the securities markets." The lack of
a principled approach to Glass-Steagall disputes threatens to subvert the
goals of the Act by obscuring those provisions that have continuing vitality
and preserving only those "regulatory remnants" that are used exclusively
to protect market participants from competition."
III. The Conduct Test
This Note proposes a "conduct" test for resolving Glass-Steagall dis-
putes. Unlike the current approach that categorizes debt instruments as
securities in a rigid fashion, the conduct test analyzes the conduct of the
bank in order to determine whether the activity is to be proscribed. This
shift prevents regulatory agencies from ignoring, as they currently do, the
purposes and policies behind Glass-Steagall . 9 The conduct test provides a
principled way of resolving Glass-Steagall disputes because it is derived
from the policies underlying the Act."
A. Statement of the Test
The universally recognized purpose of Glass-Steagall is to separate
commercial from investment banking. To achieve this purpose, it is neces-
sary to determine whether the commercial bank is engaging in a pattern
of investment banking conduct. Specifically, such conduct entails establish-
ing a sales network for the distribution of debt or equity instruments of
third parties, and promoting the sale of those instruments through that
network. In most cases, conduct that violates section sixteen also entails
active solicitation of corporate81 issuers to support this sales distribution
system.
The described conduct cannot be construed as permissible, traditional
commercial bank lending activity.82 A bank engaged in such conduct does
not stand to profit from the interest payments of a corporate borrower, nor
77. Friedman, supra note 9, at 2-3.
78. See id at 3.
79. Cf Federal Reserve Statement, supra note 72, at 25 (unnecessary to examine the policies of
the Act because "stronger view" is that commercial paper is not a security).
80. See United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848-49 (1975) (quoting Church
of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)). Because securities transactions are
economic in character, "application of the statutes should turn on the economic realities underlying
the transaction and not on the name appended thereto." Id. at 848 (emphasis added) (quoting Teher-
epnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)).
81. Most government debt is excluded from the proscriptions of the Glass-Steagall Act and there-
fore from the conduct test. See p. 109 supra.
82. The validity of analyzing a commercial bank's conduct in order to resolve disputes under § 16
of the Glass-Steagall Act was recently recognized in A. G. Becker v. Board of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys., No. 80-2614, slip op. at 21-22 (D.D.C., filed Oct. 14, 1980). Unlike this Note, however,
the court did not advocate abandoning the traditional, definitional approach to resolving Glass-Stea-
gall disputes. See id. at 14-15, 22.
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does it stand to lose if the corporation fails to repay the principal. Instead,
its only function is to act in a promotional capacity. Therefore, the bank is
engaging in impermissible investment banking conduct.8 3
Implementation of the conduct test changes the two-step approach 4
currently taken by the Federal Reserve Board and other regulatory agen-
cies in resolving Glass-Steagall controversies." The proposed test com-
bines the two steps and shifts the initial focus of analysis to the conduct of
the bank. Very simply, if a bank has established a distribution system and
is earning distribution commissions from the sale of the liabilities of an-
other corporation, it is engaged in conduct that Glass-Steagall should
prohibit.
B. The Conduct Test and the Congressional Objectives of Glass-Steagall
The conduct test limits the activities of commercial banks to conduct
that is in accordance with the objectives of the Act. The test insures that
commercial banks do not engage in the promotional aspects of investment
banking.
1. The Conflicts of Interest
The conduct test ensures that commercial banks will render impartial
investment advice by removing the incentive to promote securities held by
institutions engaging in investment banking. The test distinguishes the im-
permissible promotion of a debt instrument solely to earn a distribution
commission from the permissible banking practice of acting as a financial
principal.8 6 Congress sought to prevent banks from forming, developing,
83. Loan participations and private placements are examples of permissible commercial banking
conduct because in those transactions the banks do not function as promotional middlemen.
In a typical loan participation, a "lead bank" will negotiate a loan that is so large that it represents
an uncomfortably high, if not impermissible, proportion of the bank's total assets. To reduce its expo-
sure, the bank will "sell" participations to other commercial banks and financial institutions. In more
than 99% of loan participations, the lead bank keeps the largest asset share for itself. Interviews with
Patrick Doyle, supra note 21. In a minute fraction of cases, the lead bank will "sell" the entire
amount of the loan to other institutions. This usually occurs when a small, regional bank has already
loaned its customer the full legally permissible amount. In such a case, loan participations are distrib-
uted by the customer's banker as a service. Id.
Loan participations are considered securities for purposes of both the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
See Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 400 F.2d 989 (1969).
Commercial bank private placement activity also does not violate the conduct test. Debt instruments
that are privately placed may only be offered to a small number of investors; consequently, no sales
distribution network is established, and the conduct test is not violated.
84. See pp. 110-11 supra.
85. The Securities and Exchange Commission uses a two-step approach in which the first (defini-
tional) step involves determining whether the debt instrument is a security for the purposes of the
Securities Act of 1933. See note 73 supra.
86. The Glass-Steagall Act itself describes permissible commercial banking activities. It states that
commercial banks may "exercise . . .all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the
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or promoting expensive distribution networks for investments."' The oper-
ation of bank distribution networks, which inevitably conflicts with the
task of giving investment advice to customers," is also forbidden by the
conduct test. By eliminating such conflicts, the conduct test permits imple-
mentation of Glass-Steagall in the way most consistent with the intentions
of Congress.89
2. Public Confidence in the Commercial Banking System
The conduct test would bolster public confidence in commercial banks
because it prohibits the promotion of questionable securities in order to
make an underwriting profit: Congress concluded that securities promo-
tion, by "trading on the good name of the . . . bank,"90 involves conduct
that is incompatible with commercial banking. Default or deflation in the
value of the securities recommended to a customer damages the reputation
of the bank that recommends them,91 and is therefore not prudent com-
mercial banking. The conduct test provides the guidelines necessary for
determining which commercial bank activities are incompatible with Con-
gress's intention to foster prudent banking behavior.
IV. Commercial Paper and Legitimate Commercial Banking Functions
"Commercial paper" is the trade name for short term92 promissory
notes that financial and industrial corporations issue to raise capital. 3 In-
vestment banks vigorously contest the legality of commercial paper sales
by commercial banks, claiming that this activity violates the Glass-Steagall
Act.94 Although the current method of interpreting the Act permits such
sales, the conduct test would forbid them. 5
business of banking; by discounting and negotiating. . . evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by
buying and selling exchange, coin and bullion; [and] by loaning money or personal security ... " 12
U.S.C. § 24 (seventh) (1976).
87. See p. 104 supra; 75 CONG. REC. 9911 (remarks of Sen. Bulkley); 75 CONG. REC. 9999
(remarks of Sen. Kean).
88. See id.
89. See pp. 107-08 supra.
90. Hearings on the Operation of the National and Federal Reserve Banking Systems, Senate
Banking and Currency Comm., S. 4115, 72d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 34 (1932); 75 CONG. REC. 9912
(1932) (remarks of Sen Bulkley).
91. Id.
92. Commercial paper must mature within nine months in order to be exempt from the registra-
tion provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1976).
93. See Hurley, supra note 23, at 525; Note, supra note 26, at 372.
94. See, e.g., A. G. Becker v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 80-2614 (D.D.C.,
filed Oct. 14, 1980); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 80-2730
(D.D.C., filed Oct. 24, 1980).
95. Other similarly controversial bank activities include equity funding (the combined sale of mu-
tual funds and insurance), real estate syndication, issuance of thrift notes, mortgage guarantee insur-
ance underwriting, the deductible part of bankers' blanket bond insurance, dealings in bankers' ac-
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A. The Controversy
Commercial paper has become such an important source of short-term
financing for publicly held corporations that the last five years have been
characterized as the "commercial paper era. ' 96 During this period, com-
mercial paper has accounted for one quarter of all short-term debts out-
standing. 97 Consequently, the commercial paper market seriously en-
croaches on a traditional profit area of investment banks.98
Until July 26, 1978, commercial paper was sold either directly by the
issuing corporation, or by one of a handful of investment banks.99 Then
Bankers Trust Company began selling third party commercial paper. '
On September 26, 1980, the Federal Reserve Board gave commercial pa-
per sales an important stamp of legitimacy'0 ' by concluding that commer-
cial paper is not a "security" for the purposes of the Glass-Steagall Act,' 2
and that the Act therefore does not apply to commercial bank sales of
commercial paper. The Federal Reserve Board ruling has prompted other
large commercial banks to make final preparations to enter the commer-
cial paper market. 103
ceptances, investment advising, and portfolio investment advice.
96. J. P. Judd, Competition Between Commercial Paper Markets and Commercial Banks 39, 48
(Staff paper, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco on file with Yale Law Journal).
97. See id. at 48. Corporations generally prefer to raise cash by selling commercial paper rather
than by borrowing from commercial banks, because the former usually costs less. The prime lending
rate is often 125 basis points (1.25%) higher than the average interest rate of 90-day commercial
paper. See id. at 39; Hurley, supra note 23, at 536 n.1 1. But see Bennett, supra note 9, at 1 (many
commercial banks are cutting lending rates below prime to compete with commercial paper market).
98. See J. Judd, supra note 96, at 43. Profit on commercial paper comes from distribution com-
missions, which are typically one-eighth of one percent of the face value of the notes. Thus, if a bank
sells $100 million of a company's commercial paper, it makes $125,000. See Hurley, supra note 23, at
528.
99. As of October 1980, Moody's Commercial Paper Division listed over twenty investment banks
in its dealer directory. MOODY'S COMMERCIAL PAPER RECORD, MONTHLY STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT
Oct. 1980, at 4. Most market observers, however, believe that six investment banks handle "well over
90% of the business." Interview with W. M. Thakara, Vice President, Commercial Paper New Issuer
Development, A.G. Becker, Inc., in New York City (November 27, 1980).
100. H. Pitt & J. Kempner, The Commercial Paper Activities of Bankers Trust Company 1-2
(February 1, 1979) (unpublished memorandum on behalf of A.G. Becker Inc. to the Staff of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
101. Federal Reserve Statement, supra note 72, at 7; Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v.
Investment Co. Inst., 101 S. Ct. 973, 981 n.21 (1981) (judgment of Board of Governors, because of
their expertise, should be overturned only where no reasonable basis to support it); First Nat'l Bank
v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 658 (1923) (courts must give great weight to construction of statute
adopted by agency charged with its enforcement). The Federal Reserve Board has regulatory author-
ity over state member banks of the Federal Reserve System. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q)(2)(A) (1976).
Bankers Trust Company is a state member bank of the Federal Reserve System. Bennett, supra note
9, at 3.
102. Federal Reserve Statement, supra note 72, at 6 (Glass-Steagall Act directs that definition of
security be resolved by resort to common understanding of Congress, regulatory agencies, and banking
industry).
103. See Bennett, supra note 9, at 1. Morgan Guaranty Trust Company and Citibank both have
stated that they will begin placing commercial paper after the legal questions have been clarified. Id.
There are indications that at least two other state member banks and two national banks intend to
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B. The Present Interpretation of Glass-Steagall as Applied to Commer-
cial Paper
The Federal Reserve Board's interpretation of the Glass-Steagall Act
fails to reflect important changes in the commercial paper market that
place commercial banks in the posture of investment banks promoting the
sale of investments.' The Board's definitional approach frustrates the
objectives of the Act.
1. The Federal Reserve Board Interpretation
The Federal Reserve Board takes the position that commercial paper is
not a "security" within the meaning of the Glass-Steagall Act and there-
fore that the Act's prohibition of underwriting and dealing in securities
does not apply to commercial paper.y01 The Board arrived at its conclusion
by examining the history of commercial paper in the United States."' Us-
ing what it described as "indirect" historical evidence, 07 the Board con-
cluded that Congress did not view commercial paper, of the sort in exis-
tence when Glass-Steagall was passed, as a "security."'' 08
The Board's adoption of this definitional approach in regard to com-
mercial paper has led it to conclude that it is not "necessary to examine
the dangers that the Act was intended to eliminate."10 9 The Board main-
tains this position even though it recognizes that such dangers exist"0 and
that the sale of commercial paper by commercial banks could lead to un-
sound banking practices."' Rather than dispute the validity of the policies
underlying Glass-Steagall,"' however, the Board seeks to regulate com-
begin underwriting commercial paper following the lead of Bankers Trust. SECURITIES WEEK, De-
cember 18, 1978, at 2.
104. See p. 115 supra.
105. See Federal Reserve Statement, supra note 72; Letter from Theodore E. Allison, Secretary of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to John M. Liftin, attorney for the Securities
Industry Association, and Harvey L. Pitt, attorney for A.G. Becker Inc. (September 26, 1980) (on file
with Yale Law Journal).
106. See Letter, supra note 105.
107. See Federal Reserve Statement, supra note 72, at 14.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 25.
110. See Letter, supra note 105, at 3.
111. Id.
112. In order to justify its decision not to examine the policies behind Glass-Steagall, the Board
cites Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945, 1955 (1980), for the proposition that if the language of a
provision of the securities laws is "clear in its context," it is unnecessary to examine additional consid-
erations of policy that may have influenced the formulation of the statute. Federal Reserve Statement,
supra note 72, at 25 & n.38. It is impossible to reconcile this statement with the Board's earlier
statement that "the plain meaning of the statute cannot be dispositive of whether commercial paper is
a security under the Glass-Steagall Act." See Federal Reserve Statement, supra note 72, at 25 (em-
phasis added).
The lack of a clear definition for the term "security" and the lack of any principled means for
distinguishing between "loans" and "securities" demonstrate the futility of a purely textual approach
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mercial bank commercial paper activity,'" despite Congress's intention to
enact a prophylactic remedy." 4 The definitional approach taken by the
Board, therefore, thwarts the policy objectives of Glass-Steagall because it
applies a static method of inquiry to a financial market that has under-
gone a dramatic evolution over the last fifty years." '
2. The Evolution of the Commercial Paper Market
Today's commercial paper market is strikingly different from the one
that existed when Glass-Steagall was written." 6 The changes place banks
in the promotional posture of an investment banker advocating the sale of
an investment whenever they sell commercial paper.'' 7
In the 1930's, when the securities laws were enacted, more than ninety-
nine percent of all commercial paper was purchased by commercial banks
for their own investment portfolios." ' Commercial banks held this paper
to maturity as an asset." '9 The banks sought commercial paper in order to
receive interest income and to satisfy the Federal Reserve Board's reserve-
asset requirement.' 2' Today, only about one percent of commercial paper
is held by commercial banks for their own accounts.' Trust departments
of banks,'2 2 nonfinancial corporations, insurance companies, private pen-
to Glass-Steagall controversies. See note 84 supra. This point presupposes that the Glass-Steagall Act
does not define the term "security," a point acknowledged by the Federal Reserve Board, see Federal
Reserve Statement, supra note 72, at 6, by the SEC, see Letter from Ralph C. Ferrara, General
Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, to Neal L. Petersen, General Counsel, Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System 3 (April 20, 1979), and by the Supreme Court, see Investment
Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 635 (1971). The teaching of Aaron v. SEC therefore is irrelevant in
the context of determining whether a particular investment vehicle is a security for the purposes of the
Glass-Steagall Act.
113. See Federal Reserve Statement, supra note 72, at 25 (to prevent unsound banking practices,
Board is developing "guidelines" governing sale of third-party commercial paper by commercial
banks); cf. Letter, supra note 105, at 7 (Board regards banks' commercial paper activities as unques-
tionably prudent for sole reason that its examiners inspect banks).
114. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 639 (1971); pp. 107-09 supra.
115. See Note, supra note 26, at 367.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Bankers Trust Company Responds to your Commercial Paper Needs 4, 6 [herein-
after referred to as Bankers Trust Brochure] (undated, but copy is attached to February 1, 1979
memorandum from Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Kampelman on behalf of A.G. Becker to Staff
of the Board of the Federal Reserve System) (copies of both on file with Yale Law Journal).
118. R. FOULKE, THE COMMERCIAL PAPER MARKET 11 (1931). Commercial paper was even
defined in 1930 as "short term negotiable instruments sold to outside banking institutions." Id. at 3.
119. Id.
120. Banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System are required by the Federal Reserve
Board to hold a certain percentage of deposits on reserve either uninvested or invested in certain
highly liquid assets. U.S. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM 40 (5th ed. 1967).
121. See Hurley, supra note 23, at 529.
122. Trust accounts are customer accounts that a bank trust department administers on behalf of
the customer. A bank trust department does not promote the sale of securities to the public; it pro-
motes its expertise as fiduciary manager. Trust account purchases are separate and distinct from
purchases for a bank's own account.
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sion funds, and, increasingly, private individuals now purchase commer-
cial paper.'23
C. The Conduct Approach as Applied to Commercial Paper
The commercial paper controversy demonstrates why the "conduct ap-
proach" provides a principled test with which to resolve Glass-Steagall
controversies in today's quickly evolving financial markets. In the 1930's
there was no danger that commercial banks would promote commercial
paper and thereby cause the conflicts of interest that concerned the draft-
ers of the Glass-Steagall Act. Commercial banks had not developed distri-
bution systems for commercial paper. They participated in the commercial
paper market to earn interest income, not commissions. Today they par-
ticipate in the commercial paper market to earn distribution commissions.
To earn these commissions requires exactly the promotional, investment
banking conduct that Glass-Steagall was designed to foreclose to commer-
cial banks. Commissions give commercial banks an incentive to promote
one kind of investment over another.'24 These commissions can be earned
only by developing costly distribution systems. Once these distribution sys-
tems are established, banks must continuously cultivate both corporate is-
suers to create marketable debt, and purchasers to absorb that debt. 2 Be-
cause commercial banks conduct themselves like investment banks in
regard to commercial paper, the conduct test would prohibit commercial
banks from selling such paper.
D. Legitimate Commercial Banking Activity
The Federal Reserve Board expressed concern that the acceptance of a
definition of "security" broad enough to include commercial paper would
lead to the prohibition of legitimate commercial banking activity.'26 This
123. See Hurley, supra note 23, at 529.
124. See Letter from James J. Baechle's Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Bankers
Trust Company, to Neal L. Petersen, General Counsel, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (December 22, 1978) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
Bankers Trust Company, the only bank with an established commercial paper sales operation,
acknowledges that all of the corporations for which it distributes commercial paper were customers of
the bank before the commercial paper services were offered. These corporations remain loan custom-
ers of the bank, and as such are indebted to the bank at the same time the bank is selling the corpora-
tion's commercial paper. Id. Consequently, the temptation to convince a corporate customer to issue
corporate debt unnecessarily, or to pay back outstanding bank loans, is present here. In addition,
Bankers Trust Company had lines of credit in place to most of the issuers that currently use Bankers
Trust Company's commercial paper distribution services. Id.
125. Distribution channels are crucial to the success of a firm that hopes to win a share of the
commercial paper market. The Bankers Trust commercial paper advertising materials demonstrate
that widespread distribution is a major element in its commercial paper marketing approach. See
Bankers Trust Brochure, supra note 117, at 1-5.
126. Commercial banks may engage in activities that are "a proper incident of banking" unless
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concern applies specifically to certificates of deposit,' 7 banker's accept-
ances,1 28 and loan participations.' 2 The conduct test does not lead to the
prohibition of commercial bank involvement in these activities. Instead it
illuminates the basic distinction between these transactions and modern
commercial paper financings. In each of these transactions, banks are the
ultimate lender or borrower. The transactions do not promote the develop-
ment of distribution networks or place banks in a position where they will
put pressure on corporate clients to issue securities for the purpose of real-
izing underwriting or distribution profits. Instead, trading or distribution
is only incidental to commercial bank lending services.'30
The congressional ban on commercial banks' promotion of securities
applies when distribution commissions provide the motivation for entering
the market, as in the case of commercial paper. When commercial banks
that activity violates § 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act. Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 101 S.
Ct. 973, 979 (1981); 12 C.F.R § 225.125. The commercial banks that advised the closed-end invest-
ment funds at the center of the Board of Governors litigation earned an "advisory fee" for providing
investment advice to the investment companies. 101 S. Ct. at 979. This advisory fee differs signifi-
cantly from the sale or distribution commissions earned by promoting investments as described by the
conduct test. In the case of the advisory fee "[the] bank could not stray from its obligation to render
impartial investment advice." Id. at 987 n.39. Banks engaged in activity that violates the conduct test
necessarily stray from their obligation to render disinterested investment advice, and therefore violate
§ 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act. See pp. 112-13 supra.
127. A certificate of deposit is a written acknowledgment by a bank of the receipt of a sum of
money on deposit that the bank agrees to pay (with specified interest) to the bearer at a later date. I
BANKING L.J., BANKING LAW JOURNAL DIGEST § 220 (6th ed. 1962). A certificate of deposit is
similar to a savings deposit at a bank except that it has a fixed maturity date and is evidenced by a
certificate instead of a passbook entry. G. MUNN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 144-45
(4th ed. 1937). The banking practices of issuing certificates of deposit and discounting them are spe-
cifically authorized by the Glass-Steagall Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (seventh) (1976).
128. A banker's acceptance is a guarantee by a commercial bank that its customer will pay for
goods purchased on credit. It is identical to a guaranteed line of credit, except that the goods pur-
chased serve as collateral for the bank. Banker's acceptances expedite transactions in which the con-
tracting parties are unfamiliar with each other but have confidence in the bank's guarantees. See 1
BANKING L.J., supra note 127; G. MUNN, supra note 127, at 47-48.
129. See note 83 supra. Loan participations provide an example of how the traditional interpreta-
tion of Glass-Steagall could serve to prohibit commercial banks from engaging in permissible conduct.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has recently written that "absent greater elaboration, sales
of loan participations may raise questions under the Glass-Steagall Act." See Letter from Ralph C.
Ferrara, General Counsel to the Securities and Exchange Commission, to Neal L. Petersen, General
Counsel to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 6 (June 26, 1979) (on file with
Yale Law Journal). The SEC reached this conclusion because of its view that the broad definition of
"security" in the Securities Act of 1933 is appropriate for use in interpreting the Glass-Steagall Act.
Id.
130. There is an important distinction for Glass-Steagall purposes between transactions in which
a commercial bank sells a note that it intends to guarantee and redeem, as in the case of a banker's
acceptance or a certificate of deposit, and a transaction in which the bank sells a note in order to earn
a commission, with no obligation to guarantee the payment, as in the case of the sale of commercial
paper. In the former case, no conflicts of interest are likely to exist. If the commercial banker must
guarantee the full payment of any default, his investment advice will undoubtedly be based solely on
sound business judgment. Similarly, there is no danger that the commercial banker will be tempted to
promote a securities issue and use the proceeds to pay back bank loans if the bank is at risk in both
transactions. Thus, none of the conflicts that arise when banks sell commercial paper arise when
banks issue certificates of deposit or bankers acceptances. See pp. 104-06 supra.
The Yale Law Journal
are primarily guaranteeing credit,"' taking deposits," 2 or making loans, 3 '
Glass-Steagall proscriptions should not apply. Unlike the sale of commer-
cial paper, these activities do not entail conduct that is incompatible with
the purposes of the Glass-Steagall Act.
Conclusion
The conduct approach proposed in this Note provides a principled
method for determining when commercial banks are violating the Glass-
Steagall Act. The current use of a technical rather than a substantive
method of resolving Glass-Steagall disputes has eroded the barrier that the
Act seeks to build between commercial and investment banking. The
adoption of the conduct test will ensure that legitimate commercial bank-
ing activity will not be endangered by overzealous regulatory agencies
misapplying the Act. The conduct approach will also provide the flex-
ibility necessary for the Act to keep pace with the swift evolution of
financial instruments and markets.
131. See note 128 supra.
132. See note 127 supra.
133. See notes 83 and 129 supra.
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